Ideas from 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' by Ludwig Wittgenstein [1921], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Pears)' by Wittgenstein,Ludwig (ed/tr Pears,D. /McGuinness,B.) [RKP 1961,0-7100-7923-0]].
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expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
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2937
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What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
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6870
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I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson]
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
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2944
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If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
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9810
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The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou]
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23459
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This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value
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23512
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Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
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6429
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All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions
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23492
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Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque
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23510
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Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language
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2938
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The limits of my language means the limits of my world
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
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23499
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This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up
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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
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23508
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Science is all the true propositions
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
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2939
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If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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10910
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The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
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23462
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He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Morris,M]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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18349
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All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Rami]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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10967
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Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read]
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7087
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Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Grayling]
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4702
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The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [O'Grady]
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7056
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Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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23483
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Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Morris,M]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
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23502
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Logic fills the world, to its limits
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23504
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Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
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6428
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Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Russell]
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
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11062
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Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
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18277
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If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference
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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
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18162
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The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies
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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
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7537
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Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Monk]
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
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23496
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Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
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18154
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The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Bostock]
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13429
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The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Ramsey]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
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18268
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Apparent logical form may not be real logical form
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
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10905
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My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
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23493
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'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
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7784
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'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
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23506
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Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
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7089
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A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
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9467
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Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Jacquette]
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5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
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15089
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Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
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13830
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Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Hacking]
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5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
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19292
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Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
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18160
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The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common
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18153
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A number is a repeated operation
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
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18161
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The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
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6849
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Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Monk]
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23509
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The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
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13133
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The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
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7090
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The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Grayling]
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23464
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In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links
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23471
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The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form
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21682
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If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it
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22319
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Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names
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21683
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Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
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23473
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Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
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22311
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The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts
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22313
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The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact
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22314
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On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact
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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
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7969
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The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one
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7968
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A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
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23466
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Objects are the substance of the world
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
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23468
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Apart from the facts, there is only substance
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
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22321
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To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Potter]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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6056
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Identity is not a relation between objects
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
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22322
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You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
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6057
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Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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9442
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The only necessity is logical necessity
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
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23495
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The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
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23487
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What is thinkable is possible
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
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23470
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Each thing is in a space of possible facts
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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23507
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Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [White,RM]
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23469
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An imagined world must have something in common with the real world
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
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11027
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To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences
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23465
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The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
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12869
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Two objects may only differ in being different
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
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23503
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Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
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16907
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If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
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23479
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The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Morris,M]
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23501
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There is no a priori order of things
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
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7088
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Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Grayling]
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
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16909
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Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
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23485
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No pictures are true a priori
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
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6591
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Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
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17665
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The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Armstrong]
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14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
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2941
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Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
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17673
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The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
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2940
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The subject stands outside our understanding of the world
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16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
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23498
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The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
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23475
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The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
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7084
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What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Grayling]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
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23482
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The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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8172
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To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
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7086
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Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
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23511
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Propositions use old expressions for a new sense
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23488
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Propositions are understood via their constituents
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
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23486
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Pictures are possible situations in logical space
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
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23497
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Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
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23489
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We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
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2943
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Ethics cannot be put into words
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
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2942
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The sense of the world must lie outside the world
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